Migration diplomacy in the Gulf – non-state actors, cross-border mobility, and the United Arab Emirates by Malit, Froilan T. & Tsourapas, Gerasimos
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cjms20
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjms20
Migration diplomacy in the Gulf – non-state
actors, cross-border mobility, and the United Arab
Emirates
Froilan T. Malit Jr. & Gerasimos Tsourapas
To cite this article: Froilan T. Malit Jr. & Gerasimos Tsourapas (2021) Migration diplomacy in the
Gulf – non-state actors, cross-border mobility, and the United Arab Emirates, Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies, 47:11, 2556-2577, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2021.1878875
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2021.1878875
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 10 Feb 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 2040
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Migration diplomacy in the Gulf – non-state actors, cross-
border mobility, and the United Arab Emirates
Froilan T. Malit Jr. a and Gerasimos Tsourapas b
aDepartment of Politics and International Studies, Cambridge University, Cambridge, UK; bSchool of
Government, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
What is the role of non-state actors in the international politics of
labour migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries? This
paper employs a ‘migration diplomacy’ framework in order to
examine the politics of regional mobility while interrogating the
assumed centrality of the state in this process. It focuses on
labour migration into the United Arab Emirates and draws on a
range of primary sources in order to identify four types of non-
state actors that seek to maximise their interests within the
workings of Emirati migration diplomacy: public-private
partnerships, namely the Tadbeer (‘procurement’) centres;
corporations within the Emirati construction sector; business
elites managing subcontracting companies; and, finally, non-
governmental organisations and foreign consulting firms. The
paper identifies how each of these four sets of actors pursues
strategies that are able to strengthen, supplant, or undermine the
state’s formal migration diplomacy aims. Furthermore, the Emirati
case debunks the myth of the state as a centre of power in Gulf
migration management via the kafāla (‘sponsorship’) system.
Overall, the paper demonstates how a range of non-state actors
can navigate migration management policymaking, thereby
underlining the complexity of Gulf migration diplomacy.
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The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf [or, Gulf Cooperation Council –
GCC] constitutes one of the main clusters of migrant host states in the world, employing
35 million international migrants in 2019. The GCC accounts for over 10 per cent of all
migrants globally and is responsible for over $100 billion in economic remittances, far
surpassing American official development aid across the world (ILO 2020). Currently,
the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are two of the three top remittance-
sending countries globally (IOM 2020). Despite the region’s centrality for cross-border
mobility across the Global South, a number of gaps remain in terms of existing research
on GCC migration politics. In this article, we seek to identify the main domestic actors
involved in the international politics of labour immigration in the GCC countries, with a
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specific focus on the role of non-state actors in Emirati migration diplomacy. The litera-
ture on the politics of cross-border mobility in the GCC traditionally argues for the
importance of state-level officials, who maintain a firm hand over migration either via
direct control over entry or via the kafāla (‘sponsorship’) system. With regard to how
Gulf countries’ foreign policymaking affects immigrant labour recruitment, in particular,
the host state is historically seen as the key actor that facilitates bilateral labour agree-
ments and governs immigrant labour recruitment. Yet, this perspective obscures a
number of heretofore-unexamined non-state actors in Emirati and Gulf migration
diplomacy.
Drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary sources in Arabic and English, we
argue that four types of non-state actors enjoy a central role in UAE migration diplo-
macy. Firstly, select public-private partnerships, namely the Tadbeer (‘procurement’)
centres, have emerged to strategically control migrant domestic work recruitment
despite a formal state ban on hiring household service workers from Philippines and
Indonesia. Secondly, corporations within the construction sector continue to recruit
Indian construction workers despite the Emirati government’s reluctance to comply
with India’s e-Migrate system due to fears of potential breaches of UAE sovereignty.
Thirdly, economic elites employ sub-contracting companies as a way of circumventing
the government’s diversification strategy in order to lower overall labour costs and main-
tain their competitive advantage in the Gulf markets. Finally, non-governmental organ-
isations such as Migrant Forum in Asia [MFA] as well as foreign and local consulting
firms feed into and facilitate the Emirati state’s national, regional, and global aims via
the Abu Dhabi Dialogue process. Overall, our examination of Emirati migration diplo-
macy allows the identification and opening up of a new research agenda as well as a
more systematic investigation of the role of non-state actors in the governance of
migration in the Gulf States.
We proceed as follows: firstly, we examine existing work on the international politics
of migration in the GCC as we identify a tendency to focus on state actors’ involvement
in the management of regional cross-border mobility via the kafāla system. Secondly, we
examine how a ‘migration diplomacy’ framework allows us to underline the importance
of international processes in terms of migration processes in the GCC. We continue to
enhance existing theorisation via a discussion of non-state actors’ engagement in
migration diplomacy. We employ the case-study of the Emirates in order to identify
four particular types of non-state actors: public-private partnerships such as the
Tadbeer centres; corporations within the UAE construction sector; business elites mana-
ging subcontracting companies; and, finally, non-governmental organisations and
foreign consulting firms. We examine how each of these four actors pursues strategies
that seek to supplant, undermine, or strengthen the UAE’s formal migration diplomacy
aims. We conclude by discussing how our findings enhance existing understandings of
migration diplomacy while offering a more complete account of the international politics
of cross-border mobility in the Emirates as well as the Gulf.
The international politics of migration in the Gulf
Although a number of social science works have addressed the politics of cross-border
mobility in the Gulf (cf. Kamrava and Babar 2012; Jureidini 2019), few shed insights
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light onto the interaction between labour migration and GCC foreign policy. A primary
source of scholarly research on the topic emerges out of political economy and demogra-
phy, particularly in the decades immediately following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the
two oil crises (Birks and Sinclair 1980; Seccombe 1985).1 This body of work tends to
examine migration policymaking in the Gulf through the lens of demographic imbal-
ances between GCC nationals and non-nationals (Kapiszewski 2001; Winckler 2009).
By the early 1990s, migrant populations constituted over 70 percent of the total GCC
workforce and, in some Gulf states, as much as 90 per cent (Fargues 2013; Malit and
Al-Youha 2013). Not surprisingly, many scholars view the politics of Gulf migration
via a regime or security lens that identifies how domestic elites sought to maintain
control over the growing numbers of foreign workers (Baldwin-Edwards 2011), particu-
larly in the aftermath of migrant mobilisation during the 1950s and 1960s (Vitalis 2007;
Chalcraft 2010; Tsourapas 2018). In these analyses, the impact of the kafāla system for
migrant groups across the Gulf is central (Gardner 2010), as is the case with broader
works that discuss migrant rights (Ruhs 2013). While this line of research offers a
clear understanding of the politicisation of labour migration in the Gulf, it provides
few insights into how cross-border mobility features in the international politics of
GCC states.
A second, smaller group of political economists offers an understanding of the foreign
policy dimension of Gulf migration. Identifying that oil-producing Arab states accrue a
significant amount of national revenue from unearned income, or rent (Beblawi 1987),
these researchers seek to understand policymaking through the prism of rent-seeking
behaviour (Ayubi 1996, 224–230; Hertog 2011). Shifts in the international politics of
labour migration across the Gulf depend on global market fluctuations: for instance,
the massive immigration of labourers in the 1970s during al-Tafra is linked to the
influx of petrodollars (Korany 1986). Similarly, the subsequent shift from Arab to
Asian immigrant labour in the 1980s and, more recently, to processes of labour
market nationalisation and localisation has been driven by distinct political economy
rationales (Shah 2018). Throughout these developments, the GCC states have constituted
powerful actors that are contrasted with weaker, non-rentier countries of origin (Ibrahim
1982; Korany and Dessouki 2008). These power imbalances are evident in scholarly
studies of how sending states’ diplomatic relations with the Gulf have shaped labour
recruitment patterns – as in the case of Egypt (Tsourapas 2019), Yemen (Okruhlik
and Conge 1997), or Jordan (Brand 2013). While such research identifies the importance
of labour immigration in GCC foreign policymaking, the emphasis on oil-producing
rentier states prioritises government actions, ultimately obscuring any other domestic
actors that might affect Gulf migration management.2
More specifically, in the case of the UAE, a sizeable body of work in social sciences has
examined migration processes, albeit primarily within sociology (Ali 2011; Sabban 2014),
anthropology (Vora 2013; Inhorn 2015), and geography (Walsh 2009). In terms of the
politics of UAE migration, work has focused primarily on the logistics of citizenship
(Jamal 2015; Lori 2019), as well as political demography (De Bel-Air 2015). A small
number of works also examines how economic and socio-cultural considerations have
contributed to the espousal of ‘Emiratisation’ policies (Fargues and Shah 2018).
However, with few exceptions (Ulrichsen 2016), international relations scholars of the
Emirates tend to not examine cross-border mobility: although the foreign policy
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dimension of GCC labour migration falls within the scope of international relations,
mainstream work on the international politics of the Gulf does not typically analyse
cross-border mobility (see, for instance: Gause 2009; Hinnebusch 2013), as migration
was considered a ‘low politics’ issue for much of the twentieth century (Hollifield
2015). That said, a small number of scholars employ single-case studies to identify a
range of international politics processes – namely, how Gulf states’migration policymak-
ing interacts with ideological priorities (Russell 1989), regime threats (Van Hear 1998), or
intra-GCC antagonism (Ulrichsen 2020). Thus, a distinct gap remains in terms of how
sub-state actors might affect the international politics of UAE migration management.
Migration diplomacy and the role of non-state actors in Emirati foreign
policy
In order to understand the role of non-state actors in the management of migration in the
UAE while maintaining a focus on the foreign policy dimension, we adopt the framework
of ‘migration diplomacy.’ Adamson and Tsourapas identify a distinct link between cross-
border mobility and various forms of state diplomacy, and define migration diplomacy as
‘states’ use of diplomatic tools, processes, and procedures to manage cross-border popu-
lation mobility’ (Tsourapas 2017; Adamson and Tsourapas 2019). Drawing on a long line
of scholars (Thiollet 2011; İçduygu and Aksel 2014), they adopt a realist approach that
highlights the interest and power of state actors in migration management. This
moves beyond broader works on migration politics and governance by highlighting
how cross-border population mobility management features in states’ international
relations; Adamson and Tsourapas place the relationship between migration, interstate
bargaining, and diplomacy at the forefront. Yet, while such a framework may identify
the interests, linkages, and strategies shaping GCC states’ regulation of migration, it
does not discuss the range of sub-state actors involved in shaping migration-related pol-
icies and practices. Even across the rising number of works within this emerging research
agenda (Geddes and Maru 2020; Norman 2020; see also the special issue by Seeberg and
Völkel 2020), the domestic sources of migration diplomacy have remained underex-
plored. A ‘migration diplomacy’ approach to GCC politics would address this gap by
underlining the importance of the state in managing migration while also ‘unpacking’
it via identifying the gamut of domestic actors involved in shaping these practices.
In order to examine how non-state actors may affect GCC cross-border mobility poli-
tics and, more broadly, the workings of migration diplomacy, we focus on the single-case
study of the United Arab Emirates. The Emirati case holds particular interest given the
nature and development of that state: for one, the kafāla system involves a range of sub-
state Emirati actors, as in other GCC countries. While there are multiple channels utilised
by migrants to access this attractive job market – including social networks, travel
agencies, and government-to-government agreements – private recruitment agencies
on both the sending and receiving sides have come to drive substantial flows of
workers. These private companies have, over the past 30 years, formed well-organized
and profitable networks that provide an array of services to migrant workers and
Emirati employers. In fact, they have taken over many of the functions of migrant
labour recruitment that once were the main responsibility of sending states. As a
result, research has identified how the interests of ruling elites and economic actors
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might intersect or collide, thereby paving the way for an analysis of the domestic sources
of Emirati migration diplomacy. That said, the existing literature has thus far kept non-
state actors’ involvement in migration separate from UAE foreign policy (cf. Malit and
Naufal 2016).
At the same time, a focus on Emirati migration diplomacy brings to the forefront the
extent to which the line between state- and non-state actors remains blurred. Numerous
Emirati state officials are also business owners with keen interest in the area of labour
migration. This is a broader GCC phenomenon in which ruling family members are
also business elites across a variety of economic sectors within relatively porous states
(Hertog, Luciani, and Valeri 2013), thereby contributing to a phenomenon that
Hanieh terms khaleeji capital (Hanieh 2011). While the historical development of this
particularity is beyond the scope of this paper (on this, see Ayubi 1996), the dichotomy
between political and economic power is compounded by Gulf-wide limitations on
foreign ownership of business and real estate, which expect potential foreign investors
to partner with locals in order to set up their businesses. Again, in the UAE context,
the importance of such particularities on Emirati foreign policy have been well-estab-
lished (Rugh 2007), but with little attention paid to the management of cross-border
mobility. The fact that nationals are reluctant to join sectors that have experienced enor-
mous growth within the country – such as construction and infrastructure – continues to
accentuate the need for foreign migrant labour.
Methodologically, we remain conscious of the pitfalls in utilising a single case-study
method (B. Geddes 2003), but we also agree with its heuristic importance, particularly
at the early stages of a research agenda (George and Bennett 2005). In this case, the
single-case study of the UAE allows a deepening of our understanding of the actors
involved in shaping migration diplomacy and governance in the GCC. We consider
the Emirati as a crucial case (Gerring 2007), given the centrality of the UAE in terms
of migrant stock and flows in the GCC both with regard to intra-Arab as well as
extra-regional labour migration, primarily from South and Southeast Asia. Recognising
the challenges in identifying accurate data on migration in autocratic contexts, and in the
UAE in particular (De Bel-Air 2015), we engage in an ambitious data collection strategy
that draws on a range of primary and secondary reports in both Arabic and English, field
observation in Dubai, as well as data drawn from international organisations and media
sources.
Migration diplomacy in the United Arab Emirates
The UAE has emerged as a main destination for temporary labour migrants in the Gulf,
second only to Saudi Arabia in terms of both migrant stock and outflow of remittances
(IOM 2020). Created as a federation of seven emirates in 1971, the state develops
migration policies both on the federal and the emirate-level, including numerous
attempts at state-wide reform. Since the early 2000s, soaring oil prices have led to the
recruitment of large numbers of foreign workers – primarily Indian, Bangladeshi, and
Pakistani labourers – who currently make up over 90 percent of the country’s private
workforce (Martin and Malit 2016; see Table 1 and Figure 1). However, recruitment is
guided by distinct safety valves set by the Emirati state. The ‘demographic imbalance’
that characterises the Emirates and all GCC states, particularly with regard to
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Table 1. Total population and percentage of nationals and non-nationals in the UAE.
Year Total Population Nationals Non-Nationals % Nationals % Non-Nationals
1975 557,887 201,544 356,343 36.13% 63.87%
1980 1,042,099 290,544 751,555 27.88% 72.12%
1985 1,379,303 396,114 983,189 28.72% 71.28%
1995 2,411,041 587,330 1,823,711 24.36% 75.64%
2005 4,106,427 825,495 3,280,932 20.10% 79.90%
2010 8,264,070 947,997 7,316,073 11.47% 88.53%
2016 9,121,176 1,153,576 7,967,600 12.66% 87.35%
Source: UAE Federal Competitiveness and Statistics Authority (FCSA).a
aNote that figures do not include unauthorised migrants, estimated to range between the tens to hundreds of thousands
since the 1970s.
Figure 1. 2014 estimate of population residing in the UAE, by country of citizenship. Source: Gulf
Labor Market and Migration. Available at: http://gulfmigration.eu/uae-estimates-ofpopulation-
residing-in-the-uae-by-country-of-citizenship-selected-countries-2014.
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the Arab/non-Arab ratio, coupled with the fear of migrant-led political unrest have con-
tributed to numerous state practices, namely the pre-eminence of granting citizenship via
nasab (‘genealogy’) rather than jus solis; the expansion of the kafāla system that manages
temporary contractual employment cycles; as well as the introduction of nationalisation
processes that aim to prioritise employment for local nationals. By 2010 the Federal
Demographic Council was established by Cabinet Federal Decree No. 3, tasked with
restoring the country’s ‘demographic balance’ (Lori 2019, 118).
The UAE’s migration diplomacy strategy in terms of bilateral agreements with labour-
sending countries and international organisations is developed by the state. For much of
the country’s history, UAE migration diplomacy extended solely to regional governance
and multilateral initiatives within the GCC context. Upon independence from the
British, the Trucial States had agreed to a common immigration and citizenship policy
that put forth standardised guidelines for issuing visas and identity documents,
thereby transferring the authority over foreign residency permits to the Emirati state
(Lori 2019, 113). Much like neighbouring oil-rich Arab states, the UAE experienced a
surge of migrants from poorer Arab states, notably Yemen and Egypt, throughout the
1970s and 1980s. Over time, Gulf states would come to consider Arab workers as a secur-
ity threat, particularly due to perception of certain migrant groups siding with Iraq
during the 1990 Gulf War, which led to Arabs’ expulsion and their gradual replacement
with Southeast Asian workers. The subsequent construction boom in the UAE contrib-
uted to further recruitment of Southeast Asian migrants, as international attention
shifted towards human and labour rights abuses of noncitizens across GCC migrant
host states, including the Emirates. Indeed, despite their differences, the GCC states
share a dependence on foreign labour force as well as the reliance on the kafāla guest
worker programme. Under the latter, foreign labourers – technically, temporary contrac-
tual workers rather than immigrants – enter the country as guest workers on fixed-term
contracts, employed by a national citizen acting as their sponsor (kafeel). The human and
labour rights associated with the kafāla system – which, to borrow Lori’s term, renders
foreign workers ‘permanently deportable’ – has dominated coverage of Gulf migration
politics.3 More recently, in 2016, the International Trade Union Confederation filed a
case against the UAE for failing to uphold the International Labour Organization’s Con-
vention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (Convention No. 29). The ILO noted
that the UAE ‘lacks an adequate legal framework that prevents migrant workers from
falling into situations or practices amounting to forced labour,’ making a range of rec-
ommendations (ILO 2017).
It is at this time that the UAE turned to the Abu Dhabi Dialogue (ADD) as a way to
improve its international image as a migrant host state. Founded in 2008, the ADD
emerged as a ministerial-level consultative process on migration between the Gulf
States and the Colombo Process countries, namely Asian sending states.4 This initiative
laid the ground-work for a more ambitious UAE migration diplomacy, as the country
provides the permanent secretariat for the ADD process and has held its chairmanship
twice so far. The ADD process has aimed to increase state collaboration and engagement
between Asian and GCC countries, while also encouraging regional project collabor-
ations based on common thematic interests such as migrant recruitment migration gov-
ernance technology (albeit excluding other topics, namely labour rights or migrants’
access to legal protection). The ADD also aims for multilateral engagement with other
2562 F. T. MALIT AND G. TSOURAPAS
non-state actors like NGOs, foreign and local consulting firms, academic institutions, as
well as international organisations, such as the International Organization for Migration.
In the past few years, partly in response to the ILO case, the UAE has allowed a range of
international human rights groups to critique and, ultimately, shape its migration policy-
making. It is in the context of such state- and ADD-centred initiatives that a range of
non-state actors now seek to affect Emirati migration diplomacy, as will be discussed
below.
A. Public-private partnerships – the Tadbeer centres
With various international organisations and rights groups condemning the illegal and
unethical recruitment practices (i.e. debt bondage, modern slavery, excessive costs) in
the UAE domestic work sector, the state forcefully attempted to gain tighter control of
the interregional domestic work recruitment process. Currently, at least 306,000
migrant domestic workers are living in the UAE (Abu Dhabi Dialogue 2018).5 Following
the passage of the UAE Federal Law No. 10 of 2017 on Domestic Workers, the Ministry
of Human Resources and Emiratization (MOHRE) established the Tadbeer centres to
indirectly control and regulate the recruitment costs, processes, and placement of
migrant domestic workers in the country (for full text, see United Arab Emirates
2017). Framed as public-private partnerships, the Tadbeer centres’ ownership
structure suggests that they could be either wholly owned by nationals or in cooperation
with an expatriate business partner. Currently, of the 24 Tadbeer centres
planned initially, 23 are in full operation (Ahmad 2020). They are located across
various emirates, including Dubai (6), Abu Dhabi (6), Fujairah (4), Ras Al Khaima (3),
Ajman (3), and Sharjah (1). At the same time, MOHRE monitors and regulates the
centres’ business and recruitment transactions in migrant-sending countries through
extensive bilateral negotiation processes and agreements (i.e. MOUs). This institutional
process enables the UAE state to extend its long arm into the private sector, as it
indirectly aims to govern a highly valuable and profitable sector in the UAE labour
market and society, namely domestic work. It is worth noting that this sector that gen-
erates significant government revenue due to the high demand from both emirati and
expatriate families (see Figures 2 and 3).
While the establishment of the Tadbeer centres strengthened the state’s control over
the private sector, it also inevitably accentuated tensions with migrant-sending states. As
Federal Law No. 10 replaced manpower agencies for recruiting domestic workers with
Tadbeer centres, the latter now have the principal, exclusive right to recruit migrant
domestic workers and issue employment visas to migrant domestic workers (United
Arab Emirates 2020). However, the Tadbeer centres are not able to offer a guaranteed
employment contract to migrant workers before their arrival in the UAE to the
chagrin of migrant sending states, particularly the Philippines, which is currently the
largest exporter of domestic workers to both the UAE and the Middle East.6 In fact,
the Philippine Overseas Employment and Administration (POEA) mandates that
Tadbeer centres need to provide such support: they should offer and guarantee a state-
approved employment contract to all Filipino workers, including domestic workers,
before the Philippines can approve any foreign employment agreement or their depar-
ture (POEA 2016). Yet, existing UAE hiring practices do not guarantee an employment
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contract with an employer; in fact, they often employ domestic workers via an ‘auction’
mechanism.7
These conflicting state regulations have created not only bilateral migration diplomacy
tensions on issues of migrant domestic work but laid the ground for migrant abuse.
Figure 2. Number of domestic workers in Abu Dhabi and Dubai by sex, 2008-2016. Source: Abu Dhabi
Dialogue (2018).
Figure 3. Compensation of dometic workers in Abu Dhabi, 2005-2016. Source: Abu Dhabi Dialogue
(2018).
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Transnational recruitment practices contribute to massive trafficking of Filipina dom-
estic workers, particularly given the existing deployment ban imposed by the Philippines
on the formal recruitment on Filipino domestic workers due to their perceived precar-
ious legal status and rights in the UAE, which has been in place since June 2014. This
has negatively impacted the private sector’s inter-regional recruitment businesses in
the Philippine-UAE migration corridor, as prospective Filipina domestic workers seek
to benefit from the Emirates’ ‘soft’ immigration system that allows recruitment
brokers to convert a tourist visa into a working employment visa. As they bypass the
formal ban and enter the Emirates after transiting through Association of Southeast
Asian Nations [ASEAN] countries, Filipina domestic workers are unable to receive full
labour and employment protection from the Tadbeer centres. But Tadbeer centres, them-
selves a novel institution within the UAE, are not fully recognised actors by the Filipino
state, further accentuating the plight of migrant workers.
Thus, the Tadbeer centres play into existing tensions between the Philippines and the
UAE, which have been further exacerbated by continuous reports of abuse. This has
prompted the Philippines’ attention to conditions surrounding migrant domestic work
in other Gulf states, such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, where they are equally problematic
- if not more. In fact, the 2018 deaths of two Filipina domestic workers in Kuwait have
forced the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to issue the following advi-
sory statement on 30 December 2019:
The Philippine embassy in Kuwait is coordinating closely with Kuwaiti authorities to ensure
that justice will be served. The DFA has summoned the Kuwaiti Ambassador in Manila to
express the Government’s outrage over the seeming lack of protection of our domestic
workers at the hands of their employers and to press for complete transparency in the inves-
tigation of the case and to call for the swift prosecution of the perpetrators to the fullest
extent of the law.
Overall, as an extended yet indirect arm of the Emirati state, the newly introduced
Tadbeer centres are faced with severe structural and political constraints as they aim
to meet the high demand for domestic workers by both local and expatriate populations.
This is particularly evident in the recruitment operations in the Philippines-UAE
migration corridor context: with migration diplomacy rifts deepening between the Phi-
lippines and the UAE, Tadbeer centres will not only continue to rise as dominant players
in the UAE recruitment process but also aggressively explore other untapped migrant
domestic work markets to circumvent ongoing diplomatic impasse between the UAE
and other migrant-sending states. Although the migrant domestic work recruitment in
the Philippine-UAE migration corridor (and to an extent in Kuwait) for domestic
workers has been largely halted, Tadbeer centres have been able to shift their global
recruitment process towards other migrant-sending countries in Africa to address the
domestic work shortages across the UAE labour market (HRW 2014; Sabban 2020).
B. Corporations in the construction sector
Beyond the Tadbeer centres, the private construction sector is a second major non-state
actor in the UAE’s migration diplomacy. Construction holds a critical position in the
UAE state and economy, given its powerful ability to build vital infrastructures that is
necessary for global economic investments. Construction is also the most labour-
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intensive sector in Dubai, accounting for 6.4% of its Gross Domestic Product and
employing 21.9% of the Emirate’s total workforce, or 607,640 workers (see Figures 4
and 5). Largely dominated by locals or, in some cases, joint partnerships with expatriates
or multinational companies [MNCs], the UAE construction sector depends on migrant-
sending countries, primarily India or Pakistan, to address the structural labour shortages
in the national economy. The cheap labour cost, combined with the close proximity of
Figure 4. Construction sector contribution to Dubai GDP (%). Source: UAE Government Portal (2020).
Figure 5. Share of the construction sector in Dubai total employment. Source: UAE Government Portal
(2020).
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these migrant-sending states, has made India and Pakistan attractive to Emirati construc-
tion companies. The deep historical trade and migratory ties between the Emirates and
South Asia is also important (Abdul-Aziz, Olanrewaju, and Ahmed 2018). Currently,
over 3.42 million Indians and 1.5 million Pakistanis work in the UAE, constituting
39% of the country’s total population.
In the UAE construction sector, cross-border mobility of migrant workers requires
complex bilateral interstate negotiations, which often pose serious critical diplomatic ten-
sions due to the differential interests, priorities, and constraints for both the UAE and
migrant-sending states. The Indian government’s digital recruitment portal, eMigrate,
was put in place in 2015 and has produced particular diplomatic disputes due to the per-
ceived intrusion of the sovereignty of the existing recruitment system. The eMigrate
project is an initiative of the Overseas Employment Division of India’s Ministry of Exter-
nal Affairs, which aims to ‘automate the current emigration processes and eco-system’ via
a ‘transformational e-governance program with a vision to transform emigration into a
simple, transparent, orderly and humane process’ across a common platform.8 Currently,
eMigrate mandates all foreign firms, including UAE construction companies, to submit
their employment contracts and agreements online in order to verify veracity and com-
pliance. UAE-based construction companies are also mandated to sign a legal undertak-
ing in the host country that guarantees their state compliance levels and commitment to
protecting the rights of Indian construction workers abroad.
Competition over the two states’ migration diplomacy strategies soon emerged. On
the one hand, the Emirates view the Indian scheme as ‘intrusive’ and violating UAE
‘sovereignty’ (Al-Arabiya 2017). As the UAE Ambassador to India, Dr. Ahmed al
Banna, argues:
India wants to build a databank to extract information about these companies in the UAE.
We consider this a breach of our sovereignty. Some information only the UAE government
or concerned ministry is allowed to collect. It is also not in the Indian Embassy or Consu-
late’s ambit to conduct inspections, and we have taken strong objection to that. This is not
India’s work, this is ours. We have offered Indian authorities that we will give them the
information they desire. (Ibid.)
On the other hand, India considers the eMigrate system and its contract verification
mechanism to be part of its constitutional mandate to protect its nationals and extend
necessary constitutional protections against potential violators (Al-Arabiya 2017). This
particular tension is not merely reflective of the role of non-state actors in the UAE
migration diplomacy but also demonstrates these actors’ importance in upholding
UAE state interests, specifically in governing the labour market stability and development
of the Emirates. It also highlights how non-state actors, such as construction companies,
supplant and undermine the UAE migration diplomacy aims by exposing its diplomatic
limitations in controlling the interregional migrant recruitment process across the UAE-
India migration corridor.
In the COVID-19 pandemic context, interstate tensions between India and the UAE
involving the construction sector have risen given the potential need to repatriate
migrant construction workers. As the post-2020 lockdowns intensify in the UAE, most
construction companies have ceased their building infrastructure operations. They
largely experienced financial revenue losses, which forced them to partially or fully
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terminate the contracts of thousands of migrant construction workers, who live in high-
risk migrant industrial camps. After diplomatically requesting that migrant-sending
states facilitate the repatriation requests of their nationals, the UAE state has encountered
some sending-states’ non-cooperative status, including India. This forced the UAE gov-
ernment and the Federation of the UAE Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FCCI) to
‘reconsider’ ties with migrant-sending countries, specifically India, by threatening to
reduce future quotas or recruitment flows. With COVID-19 outbreaks intensifying
across the Emirates, interstate tension between states, along with the construction com-
panies’ difficulty in surviving the economy (i.e. business loss) will certainly deepen the
interstate tension between India and the construction companies. As the FCCI specifi-
cally emphasises:
Unfortunately, some countries are ignoring all the humanitarian and constitutional prin-
ciples by refusing to welcome their citizens or taking responsibility of transferring them
home despite what their constitutions or passports are showing and slogans of citizens’
rights inside and outside their borders. These countries should abide by their slogans and
mottos. The recent conditions showed that their mottos and slogans are mere sayings with
no meanings whatsoever. Not allowing them to enter their homeland is against all principles
of human rights, international conventions and citizenship rights. (Khaleej Times 2020)
C. Subcontracting companies
The development of Emirati migration diplomacy is influenced by another actor that is
connected to the UAE construction sector, namely subcontracting companies (Segall and
Labowitz 2017; Malit, Jenny, and Kristian 2019). These have formed to capitalise on the
sector’s booming performance and to provide room for manoeuvre for domestic business
elites. This is partly due to the stipulations of the UAE Vision 2021 National Agenda,
with MOHRE’s ‘cultural diversity enhancement program’ expecting that each construc-
tion company be graded on the diversity of its workforce, estimated according to a ratio
of employees’ nationalities. No one nationality is allowed to exceed 50%. As one senior
official at MOHRE explains:
The cultural diversity enhancement program will support UAE employers by reducing the
labor recruitment costs for establishments in which no less than 50 per cent of their work-
force belong to a variety of cultural backgrounds. (MOHRE 2019)
Linked to this initiative is the government’s ability to set quota fees per worker that each
construction company is expected to pay under the UAE Labour Law No. 8 of 1980 for
their employment visa. As per the latest MOHRE initiative, if the percentage of workers
in a single nationality exceeds 50% of a construction company’s workforce, the com-
pany’s grade will drop and a higher quota fee per worker will be charged. This creates
multiple problems due to Emirati companies’ heavy dependence on Indian construction
workers as outlined above. In fact, given that the construction sector has a set preference
of hiring Indian migrants – due to their cheaper labour cost, as well as their perceived
docility and low likelihood of protest – many firms struggle to balance or lower the
50% requirement (Segall and Labowitz 2017; Malit, Jenny, and Kristian 2019).
As a result, domestic economic elites – often in joint partnerships with wealthy
expatriates – have formed subcontracting companies (or ‘manpower supply agencies’)
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that enter into business partnerships with large construction companies. These subcon-
tracting companies constitute third parties that have various expertise and capabilities to
carry out specific portions of the works while, importantly, not being bound by the 50%
rule. They exist to serve the overall national interests of the UAE state and the private
sector, while also simultaneously navigating interstate regulations that are often
marred by diplomatic tensions and human rights abuses. Companies like these, which
play a crucial role in managing the cross-border mobility of millions of Indian, Bangla-
deshi, Pakistani and Nepali migrant workers, often charge visa fees to workers them-
selves, which is illegal according to UAE law; they refuge to pay agreed wages; they
confiscate workers’ passports, and offer little protection against safety and health hazards.
In terms of their importance for Emirati migration diplomacy, subcontracting compa-
nies have evolved to act as ‘conduits’ that operate on the interstate level between the UAE,
countries of origin, namely India and other South Asian countries, and private construc-
tion companies. More prominently, subcontracting companies’ operations frequently
mar the country’s international profile: in 2015, Nardello & Co. highlighted the exploi-
tative role they played in the construction of the NYU Abu Dhabi campus (Nardello &
Co. 2015). Human and labour rights violations are particularly prominent by subcon-
tracting companies in the construction sector (Human Rights Watch 2006). These viola-
tions have a direct effect on Emirati migration diplomacy: in 2012, the UAE government
implemented labour market restrictions to Bangladeshi migrant workers, citing various
illegal and unethical recruitment violations such as excessive recruitment costs, debt
bondage, and high rates of absconding in the Bangladesh-UAE migration corridor
(Herve and Arslan 2017). A senior officer of the UAE-based Bangladesh Civil Society
for Migration, Syed Saiful Haque, acknowledged that ‘it can be described as a diplomatic
failure of the Bangladesh government to reopen the UAE labour market over the last
eight years’ (New Age 2020). This ongoing diplomatic incident did not only impact sub-
contracting companies’ access to millions of Bangladeshi construction workers, but also
has continued to become an interstate diplomatic tension between the UAE and Bangla-
deshi governments in the Emirati labour market. In the context of combined legal and
political pressures, the UAE introduced a range of initiatives, including the UAE
Federal Law No. 10 of 2017 on Domestic Workers, as discussed above.
Furthermore, the immediate repatriation of low-skilled Indian or South Asian migrant
construction workers due to COVID19 will become a critical issue, given the non-
payment behaviour of subcontracting companies. For instance, MOHRE implemented
Ministerial Resolution No. 279 of 2020 (‘Regarding the stability of employment in
private sector companies during the period applying precautionary measures to
contain the spread of the novel coronavirus’) protecting the rights of employers by
enabling them to restructure existing employment contracts. In particular, the Emirati
state’s ministerial resolution empowered all Emirati employers, including subcontracting
companies, to change contractual agreements with workers from full to part-time and
amend their prevailing wage scales to offset any financial losses in the context of
the current economic downturn due to COVID19 pandemic. However, if subcontracting
companies fail to pay workers’ settlements or facilitate their repatriation, it is highly likely
that they will face massive criticisms from various global rights groups for their failure to
uphold the labour and human rights of migrant workers. This particular situation has
already been highlighted by multiple global rights and media groups that blame the
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UAE private sector, numerous subcontracting companies, as well as the state for their
failure to extend adequate social protection to migrant workers. In other words, sub-
state actors within the Emirates private play a dominant role in shaping the country’s
foreign policy image, but in a manner that also exposes the state’s sectoral vulnerabilities.
D. NGOs & consulting firms
Finally, migrant NGOs and foreign consulting firms have played an increasingly impor-
tant role in shaping the UAE’s migration diplomacy framework strategy. Various
migrant rights NGOs have consistently exerted transnational political pressures
towards the UAE, including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, International
Trade Union Confederation. Others have increasingly developed deeper institutional
cooperation with the UAE: Migrant Forum in Asia [MFA], for example, is an influential
Philippine-based regional network of non-government organizations (NGOs), associ-
ations and trade unions of workers, and individual advocates in Asia. Committed to
protect and promote the rights and welfare of workers, MFA has historically condemned
the labour rights and abuses of migrant workers under the kafāla sponsorship system in
the Gulf countries, including the Emirates. Specific criticisms revolved around workers’
weak access to justice, immobility, contract slavery, debt bondage, and illegal/unethical
recruitment practices, such as contract substitution.9 In its 2011 report on the UAE,
for instance, MFA identified how
serious gaps exist between the procedures as proscribed by national laws/policies and the
actual experience of migrants as they navigate the recruitment process. These gaps leave
workers vulnerable to mistreatment, abuse, and exploitation on the part of unscrupulous
recruitment agencies and their sub-agents. Numerous gaps between policy and practice
have been identified across a variety of national contexts; the most salient of these is the
point of collusion between recruitment agencies in the sending and receiving states.
(Migrant Forum in Asia 2011)
With shifting domestic leadership and regional foreign policy interests, MFA is one of the
actors that have become a strategic non-state partner of the UAE state, regularly partici-
pating as a non-state ‘observer’ in various interregional consultative migration dialogues
including the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. In recent years, MFA has been approached as a stra-
tegic collaborator for the UAE and other Gulf states, as it appears to support the Emirati
image of a global multilateral player in governing labour migration in the Asia-Gulf
migration corridor and beyond. The NGO has responded positively to UAE invitations
to conduct field visits MOHRE and Tadbeer Centres (Migrant Forum in Asia 2020), sig-
nalling a desire for deeper institutional ties. At the same time, MFA has sought to build
partnerships with UAE-based institutions such as the Dubai Foundation on Women and
Children (Sallam 2019), thereby shaping discourse and policymaking on migration. MFA
is one of numerous NGOs that have sought to secure resources and partnerships via their
involvement in state and regional networks, as well as the ADD, with the broader aim of
building global legitimacy and status.
Other non-state actors, including foreign and local consulting companies, such as
McKinsey&Company, and academic institutions have also contributed to the shaping
of UAE migration diplomacy. While it is difficult to examine the degree and impact of
foreign consulting companies on the UAE migration policy, these actors play both
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technical and symbolic roles in various migration policy designs for the UAE state. They,
for example, often prepare various technical research reports and policy recommen-
dations to the UAE state, shaping – directly or indirectly – the state’s migration govern-
ance or policy options or choices both in the short and long run. While the UAE state’s
decision largely prevails, it is logical to conclude that these non-state actors in UAE
migration diplomacy still play a critical role not only in the development of their
migration governance/diplomacy engagements but also in building their foreign policy
image and reputation in both regional and global migration governance context.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the workings of four distinct non-state actors within the
UAE – the Tadbeer centres, construction companies, subcontracting firms, as well as
NGOs and foreign consulting firms – as they seek to affect Emirati migration diplomacy.
Usually examined from a state-centred perspective, Emirati migration diplomacy is
actually shaped by a range of non-state actors: the Tadbeer centres accentuate
bilateral tensions between the UAE and sending states, particularly the Philippines; the
domestic construction sector’s interest in recruiting Indian workers via eMigrate is
seen as threatening UAE sovereignty; subcontracting companies frequently aim to cir-
cumvent Emirati legal stipulations, thereby creating further areas of conflict with
migrant-sending states; finally, NGOs and consulting firms are often co-opted by the
Emirati state in order to contribute to the attractive regional and global image that the
government seeks to put forth. Together, these four types of non-state actors indicate
the wealth and complexity of processes that underpin the evolution and practices of
Emirati migration diplomacy.
Beyond contributing to the nascent literature on the politics of migration into the
UAE, we also seek to push the field further by interrogating the extent to which state
actors are solely responsible for the development and conduct of ’migration diplomacy.’
In particular, the UAE example highlights how foreign policy decision-making vis-à-vis
cross-border mobility is also shaped by a range of firms, corporations, domestic insti-
tutions, as well as local and expatriate economic elites. Each of these actors is driven
by separate agendas and pursues interest-maximising strategies in ways that may
strengthen or undermine formal state agendas: occasionally, these actors support the
Emirati image of a global player in the governance of labour migration – as in the
case of select NGOs or consulting companies; other times, non-state actors seek to
bypass formal regulations – as in the case of subcontracting companies; finally, they
may seek to opposte governmental regulations – as in the case of the construction
sector. Throughout these processes, the UAE state itself develops novel institutions –
such as the Tadbeer centres – as it seeks to reconcile divergent domestic political and
economic agendas.
At the same time, the findings of the paper hint at potential diffusion effects in terms of
migration diplomacy processes across the GCC, which have yet to be examined in the
relevant literature: Saudi migration management is dominated by business-government
coalitions, with recruitment firms constituting ‘key mediators in migration diplomacy,’
in the words of one CEO, who had participated in the negotiations on minimum
wages with Indonesia (Thiollet 2019). Not unlike patterns found in the Emirates,
JOURNAL OF ETHNIC AND MIGRATION STUDIES 2571
Saudi Oger, a local construction firm, faced complaints of not paying wages to tens of
thousands of Indian workers in 2016; this created a bilateral diplomatic incident that
involved the distribution of 15 tons of food by the Consulate General of India in
Jeddah to avoid a ‘food crisis,’ as the Indian foreign minister declared (Reuters 2016).
Kuwait, as well as other Gulf states, have faced bilateral crises with migrant sending
states that involve domestic workers recruited via a range of labour agencies – again,
reminiscent of the workings of the Tadbeer centres examined above.
Overall, beyond distinct findings about the management of UAE migration diplo-
macy, this paper points to a range of future work that could follow from this analysis.
Firstly, we argue that the involvement of non-state actors in the foreign policy of
migration states is important and merits further examination. We demonstrate here
that, even in cases of non-democratic regimes, policymaking on migration continues
to take into account the interests of a range of sub-state actors. Thus, targeted research
on the international politics of migration across the GCC would allow for a more com-
plete understanding of the governance of cross-border mobility. Secondly, we demon-
strate the utility of ‘migration diplomacy’ as a framework for understanding the
interstate dimension of migration management while arguing for further work on the
importance of non-state actors. If we go beyond the Emirates or the GCC context, it
becomes apparent how a range of political parties, media organisations, transnational
corporations as well as international organisations seek to affect the conduct of migration
diplomacy in Europe, North America, as well as the Global South. Ultimately, the inter-
national politics of global migration and mobility continue to provide a ripe area for
further analysis.
Notes
1. We note that the GCC emerges in 1981 as a regional organisation between Bahrain, Kuwait,
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. For ease of reading, we use the
term to denote the Arab states of the Persian Gulf (except Iraq) in the pre-1981 period, as
well.
2. For a notable exception, see Thiollet (2019) on public-private partnerships across the GCC.
3. It is worth noting that, faced with international criticism, a number of GCC states have
made steps to restrict the kafāla system, most notably Qatar.
4. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue is a voluntary and non-binding inter-government consultative
process, engaging seven Asian host states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and UAE; and eleven sending states: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, India, Indo-
nesia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam. Regular observers
include the IOM, ILO, the private sector, and civil society actors. The current chair is Sri
Lanka.
5. This data excludes migrant domestic workers who are based in the Northern Emirates
(Sharjah, Ajman, Fujairah, Ras Al Khaima, and Umm Al Quwain). It also excludes undocu-
mented, freelance, and part-time domestic workers for local and expatriate employers in the
Gulf countries.
6. Approximately 679,819 Filipinos live in the UAE, according to the latest estimates.
7. Current UAE hiring practices include (1) direct sponsorship; (2) direct sponsorship after 6
months; (3) Tadbeer sponsorship; and, (4) time-based packages.
8. India’s online platform is available at: https://emigrate.gov.in/ext/about.action.
9. See MFA’s website, http://mfasia.org/resources/reports/all-mfa-reports/.
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